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ABSTRACT
We measure a country's growth opportunities by investigating how its industry mix is priced in
global capital markets, using price earnings ratios of global industry portfolios. We derive three sets
of empirical results. First, these exogenous growth opportunities strongly predict future changes in
real GDP and investment in a large panel of countries. This relation is strongest in countries that
have liberalized their capital accounts, equity markets, and banking systems. Second, we re-examine
the link between financial development, investor protection, capital allocation, and growth. We find
that financial development and investor protection measures are much less important in aligning
growth opportunities with growth than is capital market openness. Third, we formulate new tests of
market integration and segmentation. Under integration, the difference between a country's local PE
ratio and its global counterpart should not predict relative growth, but the difference between its
"exogenous" global PE ratio and the world market PE ratio should predict relative growth.
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In a perfectly integrated world economy, capital should be invested where it expects to earn
the highest risk-adjusted return. Much of the research on real variables and quantities is
strongly at odds with the notion of global integration. For example, in their classic study of 16
developed countries, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found that domestic saving rates explain
over 90% of the variation in investment rates. Because the Feldstein and Horioka sample
ends in 1974, it does not reﬂect the considerable progress towards globalization in the 1970s
and 1980s. However, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) continue to ﬁnd a high correlation between
domestic investment and savings for the 1990-97 period, both for the OECD countries and
a group of mid-income emerging countries. Apart from a home bias in investment, research
has documented a home bias in trade. Even controlling for tariﬀs, a country is much more
likely to trade within its own borders than with neighboring countries.1 There is also a
well-documented home asset bias. Despite uncontroversial diversiﬁcation beneﬁts, there is a
strong preference for investing in domestic securities.2
While the case for imperfect integration is strong when using real/quantity variables, it is
more mixed when using prices and returns. For example, Harvey (1991) ﬁnds evidence that
a global version of the CAPM cannot be rejected in the majority of developed country equity
returns (with Japan as the exception). For emerging markets, Bekaert and Harvey (1995,
2000) provide sharper evidence against the hypothesis of global equity market integration.
While the welfare beneﬁts from full integration may be large (see Lewis (1999)), the
beneﬁts of increasing globalization are being questioned.3 We add a new perspective to the
literature. Our research proposes a simple measure of country-speciﬁc growth opportunities
based on two rather non-controversial assumptions. First, the growth potential of a country
is the growth potential of its mix of industries. Second, price earnings (PE) ratios contain
information about growth opportunities. If markets are globally integrated, we can measure
1See, for example, McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1998).
2See, for example, French and Poterba (1991), Tesar and Werner (1995), Baxter and Jermann (1997),
and Lewis (1999).
3See, for example, Rodrik (1998) and Stiglitz (2000).
1a country’s growth opportunities by investigating how its industry mix is priced in global
capital markets using the price earnings ratios of global industry portfolios. This perspective
potentially oﬀers a number of useful economic insights.
First, for each country in the world, it permits the construction of an exogenous growth
opportunity measure that does not use local price information. Such a measure should prove
useful in numerous empirical studies seeking to avoid endogeneity problems. One example is
the study by Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2004), which examines the eﬀect of equity mar-
ket liberalization on growth. If countries liberalize when growth opportunities are abundant,
regressions of future growth on a liberalization indicator suﬀer from a severe endogeneity
problem. Measures of growth opportunities that use local price information are problematic
because they may either reﬂect “exogenous” growth opportunities or better growth prospects
induced by the liberalization decision. For the exogenous growth opportunity measure to
be useful, it must actually predict growth. That is, countries that happen to have a high
concentration of high PE industries should grow faster than average. We ﬁnd that they do.
Second, our framework can be employed to shed new light on the link between ﬁnancial
development, capital allocation, and growth (see Levine (2004) for a survey). Research by
Rajan and Zingales (1998), Wurgler (2000), LaPorta et al. (2000) stress the role of ﬁnan-
cial development in relaxing external ﬁnancial constraints and improved investor protection
as the critical growth channels. However, recent work by Fisman and Love (2003, 2004)
suggests that ﬁnancial development simply better aligns industry growth opportunities with
actual growth. We test this hypothesis directly in a panel framework, in contrast to the
purely cross-sectional approach followed in the existing literature. Moreover, the literature
implicitly ignores the role of international capital ﬂows. We also investigate how important
ﬁnancial openness is for aligning growth opportunities with growth. If ﬁnancial liberalization
is eﬀective, countries that have liberalized their capital accounts, equity markets, or banking
sectors, should display a closer association between growth opportunities and future real
activity.
Third, our measure can be used in formal tests of market integration that bridge research
on real quantities with price-based variables. When growth opportunities are competitively
2priced and exploited in internationally integrated markets, PE’s for ﬁrms in the same indus-
try should be equalized (barring risk diﬀerences) across countries. Consequently, under the
null of market integration, the diﬀerence between a country’s industry weighted global PE
ratio and the world market PE ratio should predict future real GDP growth relative to world
growth. Conversely, the diﬀerence between a country’s global and local PE ratio should not
predict growth in excess of world growth. We also investigate how these integration tests
depend on measured degrees of ﬁnancial openness.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two motivates our growth
opportunities measure using a simple present value model, details its construction, its link
with market integration, and provides some summary statistics. The third section checks
whether our growth opportunity measure indeed predicts growth, contrasting the predictive
performance of local with global measures. The fourth section formulates and conducts our
test of market integration. Some concluding remarks are oﬀered in the ﬁnal section.
2 Measuring Growth Opportunities
2.1 Growth opportunities, market integration, and economic growth
Holding a number of factors constant, higher price earnings ratios indicate high growth
opportunities. Investors are willing to pay a large multiple of today’s earnings for the stock
only if they believe that there will be a high rate of growth in the future. Of course, there
are other determinants of the price to earnings ratio, such as risk.
Others have proposed diﬀerent proxies for growth opportunities. The corporate ﬁnance
literature often uses market to book value as a proxy for Tobin’s Q and a measure of invest-
ment opportunities (see e.g. Smith and Watts (1992), Booth et al. (2001), and Allayannis et
al. (2003)). Fisman and Love (2003) and Gupta and Yuan (2004) use historical sales growth
of U.S. industries as a measure of growth opportunities. In contrast to sales growth, PE has
the advantage of being forward looking.
In integrated world capital markets, growth opportunities are competitively priced. This
implies that a country’s PE ratio for a particular industry should not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from
3its world counterpart. However, there are obviously diﬀerent growth opportunities across
industries. Hence, one source of local GDP growth relative to world GDP growth is the
weighting of industries within a particular country. If a country has a large concentration in
high PE (high growth opportunity) industries, then it should grow faster than the world.
To formalize this, we view each country as consisting of a set of industries that receive
stochastic growth opportunities. Under full integration, all opportunities are competitively
priced and exploited, so there is no country-speciﬁc growth opportunity for any industry.
Let (logarithmic) earnings growth be denoted by ∆ln(EAt) and let countries and industries
be indexed by i and j, respectively. Assume
∆ln(EAi;j;t) = GOw;j;t¡1 + ²i;j;t; (1)
where GOw;j;t¡1 represents the stochastic growth opportunity for each industry j which does
not depend on the country to which the industry belongs. In contrast, ²i;j;t is a country and
industry speciﬁc earnings growth disturbance. The discount rate process for each industry
(±i;j;t) is an aﬃne function of the world discount rate (±w;t), as would be true in a ﬁnancially
integrated market.
±i;j;t = rf(1 ¡ ¯i;j) + ¯i;j±w;t; (2)
where ¯i;j represented the exposure to systematic risk for industry j in country i. In addition,
suppose that
¯i;j = ¯j: (3)
That is, industry systematic risk is the same across integrated countries. Of course, this
assumption will not hold if there are leverage diﬀerences across countries.
For quite general dynamics for ±w and GOw;j, but with normally distributed shocks,
Appendix A shows that it is possible to derive, in closed-form, the PE ratio as an inﬁnite
sum of exponentiated aﬃne functions of the current realizations of the growth opportunity
(with a positive sign) and the discount rate (with a negative sign).
While the resulting expression is unwieldy, it can be linearized to yield:
pei;j;t = ¯ ai;j +¯ bi;j±w;t + ¯ cjGOw;j;t (4)
4where pe is the log PE ratio. Under full integration, ¯ bi;j = ¯ bj, and ¯ cj does not depend on
country i because of the assumption in (1). Why do certain countries grow faster than the
average? In a fully integrated world, there are only two channels of growth for a particular
country: luck (the error term) and an industry composition that diﬀers from the world’s.
These assumptions also imply that industry PE ratios are similar across countries as they
are determined primarily by global factors.4
Global industry PE ratios therefore contain the same information about industry growth
opportunities in a given country as local PE ratios. As a consequence, as local and global
industry PE ratios move together, the diﬀerence between them should contain no information
about the country’s future economic performance relative to the world economy. In contrast,
this is not true when markets are not fully integrated and growth opportunities are not
priced globally (but locally). That is, the link between our growth opportunities measures
and future growth can lead to a test of market integration.
Let PEi denote the vector of industry PE ratios in country i and PEw the vector of world
industry PE ratios. Similarly, deﬁne country and world industry weights by IWi and IWw,
respectively. Combining these vectors for country i, we deﬁne local growth opportunities







These deﬁnitions are summarized in Table 1. In integrated markets, LGO and GGO re-
ﬂect the same information and should hence both predict economic growth in country i.
Furthermore, the diﬀerence between the two measures, which we call local excess growth op-
portunities (LEGO), should be constant and should therefore have no predictive power for
relative economic growth. If markets are not fully integrated, though, LGO and GGO will
4There is a country-speciﬁc intercept that comes from volatility terms and a potentially country-speciﬁc
component to the discount rate, but the time variation in the PE ratio is driven by global factors. However,
if there are systematic leverage diﬀerences across countries, PE ratios across countries will react diﬀerently
to changes in global discount rates.
5display diﬀerent temporal behavior and LEGO should predict economic growth in country
i in excess of world economic growth. In other words, under our auxiliary assumptions, the
hypothesis of no predictability constitutes a market integration hypothesis.
If, on the other hand, we start from the hypothesis that markets are completely seg-
mented, we do not expect global industry PE ratios to contain information about local
growth opportunities. Hence, GGO should not necessarily predict economic growth in coun-
try i. Moreover, let’s deﬁne the diﬀerence between GGO and the log of the world market
price earnings ratio (WGO) as:





Under the null of market segmentation, GEGO should not predict relative growth in country
i as global prices contain no information about exploitable growth opportunities. If the
hypothesis of market segmentation is incorrect, GEGO should predict economic growth in
country i relative to world economic growth, because it reﬂects the diﬀerence between local
and global industry composition. Under the above assumptions of market integration, this
diﬀerence should be the only measure predicting relative growth. Predictive regressions of
future relative economic growth onto GEGO allow us therefore to also test the hypothesis of
market segmentation. Table 1 summarizes the proposed measures of growth opportunities
as well as their ability to predict economic growth under diﬀerent assumptions.
2.2 Constructing the growth opportunity measures
We construct the measures of growth opportunities discussed above for a sample of 50 coun-
tries, listed in Appendix Table A1.
To construct LGO and WGO, we simply take natural logs of the country-speciﬁc or
world market PE ratio. We use monthly PE ratios from Datastream as the primary source.
A few countries in our sample are not covered by Datastream and we use PE ratios from the
Standard & Poor’s Emerging Markets Data Base (IFC) instead. For Italy, Norway, Spain,
6and Sweden, we use PE ratios from MSCI to exploit the longer time series compared to
Datastream.
For the construction of our exogenous measure of growth opportunities, GGO, we re-
quire global industry PE ratios as well as country-speciﬁc industry weights. We obtain
global industry PE ratios for 35 industrial sectors with 101 sub-sectors from Datastream.
We construct two alternative sets of country-speciﬁc industry weights; the ﬁrst uses market
capitalization and the second uses value added to construct relative weights. Most of the
results in the paper are based on the market capitalization weights. As a robustness check,
we present some results based on an alternative value-added weighting.5 For 21 of our 50
countries, our measure simply uses the Datastream data to calculate the market capitaliza-
tion of a country’s industries relative to the country’s total stock market capitalization for
35 industries. For the remaining 29 countries, we use the 82 industries used by the IFC
to come up with an industry weight vector. The local weights for these 82 industries are
matched with the Datastream price earning ratios by linking the 101 Datastream sub-sectors
to the corresponding local market industry structure. Second, for our robustness exercise,
we use value added data from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database which covers 28
manufacturing industries in a large number of countries. The weight of an industry in a
given country is again determined by the industry-speciﬁc value added relative to the total
value added by the manufacturing sector in that country. A similar matching process links
the 28 manufacturing industries used by UNIDO to the Datastream price earnings ratios.6
Appendix B provides much more detail about the construction of all measures of growth
opportunities.
Our tests may have low power when discount rate changes dominate the variation of the
PE ratios. Therefore, we create an alternative measure by removing a 60-month moving
5A full set of results based upon the value added weighting is available upon request.
6In a related application, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004) use the UNIDO weights and world industry
measures of external ﬁnancing needs, to construct an exogenous measure of a country’s external ﬁnancing
needs.
7average from the standard measure. For example, we deﬁne LGO MA as:






The relative measure is less likely to be dominated by discount rate changes, if discount rates
are more persistent than growth opportunities, for which there is some empirical evidence.
GGO MA, LEGO MA, and GEGO MA are calculated analogously.
While some of our growth opportunity measures are available at a monthly frequency
from as early as January 1973 until December 2002, the starting points for measures using
local PE ratios vary across the 50 countries and other macro variables are available only at
an annual frequency. Therefore, we only use the December values of our growth opportunity
measures from 1980 until 2002. In addition to the complete set of the 50 countries, we study
the subset of 17 developed countries for which we are able to construct LGO and LEGO for
all years between 1980 and 2002. We also consider a subset of 30 emerging market countries
for which the LGO and LEGO time series are of varied length. Table 2 provides a summary
of the construction of all the variables and the data sources.
2.3 Comparing the growth opportunity measures
Table 3 contains summary statistics for the growth opportunity measures used in Sections 3
and 4, where we will investigate the predictive content of the diﬀerent growth opportunity
measures with respect to GDP growth and investment growth.
Panel A presents summary statistics for our unadjusted growth opportunity measures,
averaged over diﬀerent country groups. The measure of local growth opportunities, LGO,
is based on local PE ratios. Not surprisingly, it exhibits substantial time-series variation.
It exhibits substantial cross-sectional variation as well. GGO, our measure of exogenous
growth opportunities, show lower dispersion than LGO. When comparing the sample of
developed countries to the emerging market sample, we ﬁnd little diﬀerence in the means and
standard deviations of LGO and GGO. LEGO, the industry-weighted diﬀerence between
information contained in local and global PE ratios, is on average higher in developed
countries (¡0:208) than in emerging market countries (¡0:494). Similarly, GEGO has a
8higher mean in the sample of developed countries (0.044 vs. 0.009), possibly reﬂecting a
more favorable industrial composition in developed countries. The variability of LEGO and
GEGO is lower in the sample of developed countries than in the sample of emerging market
countries.
Panel B reports the same summary statistics for the adjusted growth measures, that is
the original measures less a 60-month moving average. With the exception of LGO MA,
the same pattern as in Panel A emerges. LGO MA appears to be lower and more volatile
in emerging market countries compared to developed countries. Remember, though, that
the availability of local PE ratios is limited for emerging countries, so that the summary
statistics for measures of local growth opportunities are not directly comparable across the
two samples.
Panel C presents correlations between the diﬀerent unadjusted as well as adjusted mea-
sures of growth opportunities. In both cases, the correlation between LGO and WGO and
LGO and GGO is substantially higher for developed countries than for emerging market
countries. The correlation between GGO and WGO as well is high for all countries, con-
ﬁrming that changes in GGO are mainly driven by changes in the global PE ratios rather
than by slowly evolving industry weights. While not reported, the correlation between our
measure of exogenous growth opportunities and the alternative measure that uses value
added weights is similarly high for all countries.
Given that developed countries should be more open than emerging countries, developed
countries are also likely to have experienced increased international integration over the
past 20 years. For the sample of developed countries, Figure 1 shows the evolution of
the average absolute value of LEGO, i.e. the distance between LGO and GGO. While
noisy, there appears to be a downward trend in the annual sample average, consistent with
increasing market integration. Still using only observations from developed countries, we run
a regression of the absolute value of LEGO onto a (country-speciﬁc) constant and a time
trend. We ﬁnd a negative (-0.0076) and highly signiﬁcant (standard error: 0.0018) trend
coeﬃcient, conﬁrming a reduction in the distance between LGO and GGO for our sample
of developed countries.
9We expect local and global measures of growth opportunities to converge when countries
become more integrated, but we have no such prior with respect to GEGO (the diﬀerence
between GGO and the log of the world price to earnings ratio (WGO)). Figure 2 shows that
for developed as well as emerging market countries the absolute value of GEGO seems to
have decreased over time up until about 1998.
One potential explanation is that diﬀerences in industrial composition across countries
have decreased over time. To explore this further, we measure the diﬀerence between a
country’s industrial composition and the world’s industrial composition. For each developed
country, we calculate the average absolute value of the diﬀerences between the country’s in-
dustry weights and the world’s industry weights for each year. Figure 3 shows that diﬀerences
between local and world industrial composition have decreased over time. For some countries
this process is more pronounced. For example, the industrial composition of the Austrian
economy has moved substantially closer to the world’s industrial composition. On the other
hand, the relative industrial composition of the U.S. has changed little. Given its economic
weight in the world economy, this is, of course, not surprising. Importantly, the graph shows
that on average a country’s industrial composition diﬀers substantially from the world’s in-
dustrial composition. Under the null of market integration, cross-sectional variation in this
composition is the only factor that explains cross country growth diﬀerences.
3 Do Growth Opportunities Predict Growth?
3.1 Econometric framework
The ﬁrst regressions we consider are
yi;t+k;k = ®i;0 + ®i;1;tLGO MAi;t + ´i;t+k;k (10)
yi;t+k;k = ®i;0 + ®i;1;tGGO MAi;t + ´i;t+k;k (11)
where yi;t+k;k is the k-year average growth rate of either real per capita gross domestic
product or investment for country i. We run similar experiments using LGOi;t and GGOi;t
10as the regressors.7 We follow the convention in the growth literature employing k = 5 to
minimize the inﬂuence of higher frequency business cycles in our sample. We maximize the
time-series content of our estimates by using overlapping ﬁve-year periods.
We include country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, ®i;0, consistent with the model in Section 2, to
capture cross-sectional heterogeneity and potentially omitted variables. Regressions (10) and
(11) both test whether our growth opportunity measures indeed predict growth. However,
the GGO-measure should only predict growth in integrated markets. Therefore, the slope
coeﬃcient ®i;1;t is modelled as a linear function of various measures of openness, with the pa-
rameters constrained to be identical in the cross-section. We employ the pooled time-series,
cross-sectional (panel) Generalized Method of Moments estimator presented in Bekaert, Har-
vey, and Lundblad (2001). Standard errors are constructed to account for cross-sectional
heteroskedasticity and the overlapping nature of the growth shocks, ´i;t+k;k. This estimator
looks like an instrumental variable estimator but it reduces to pooled OLS under simplifying
assumptions on the weighting matrix.
3.2 Local versus (exogenous) global growth opportunities
We present estimates for ®i;1;t in Table 4 for each of our three samples (ﬁxed eﬀects are
not reported) for both GDP and investment growth. In the table, we force ®i;1;t to be an
identical time-invariant constant across all countries. In panel A, we present estimates for
regression (10), which explore the extent to which reported local market PE ratios house
information about country-speciﬁc growth opportunities, using both LGO and LGO MA.
Unfortunately, the time-series history on local market PE ratios is limited (see Appendix
Table A1); hence, we report estimates for an unbalanced panel, maximizing the sample
history for each country.
7We also consider a risk-adjusted growth opportunities measure. We regress each global industry PE
ratio onto the conditional world market variance, estimated as a GARCH(1,1), and then take the intercept
and residual as the risk-adjusted PE ratio. Combining these adjusted global industry PE ratios with the
corresponding industry weights, we obtain a risk-adjusted growth opportunities measure for each country.
The evidence (not reported) is qualitatively unchanged.
11Overall, country-speciﬁc growth opportunities, as measured by local PE ratios, are infor-
mative about future economic activity. For example, the estimates for all countries suggest
that, on average, a one standard deviation increase in local growth opportunities, that is
an increase of 0.3541 in LGO MA, is associated with a 15 and 55 basis point increase in
annual output and investment growth, respectively. The estimated eﬀect is somewhat more
pronounced for the developed markets than the general case (all countries), but in both cases
highly statistically signiﬁcant.
For the emerging markets, the association is positive, but weak economically and not
uniformly signiﬁcant. There are many possible reasons for this apart from a true lack of
predictive information. First, we have fewer data points for emerging markets. Second, our
tests may have less power for emerging markets because other factors, such as political risk or
structural changes (market reforms for instance) may be relatively more important in driving
prices than growth opportunities. Finally, the stock market in these countries is generally
smaller and less representative of the total economy compared to developed markets.
In panel B of Table 4, we present evidence on regression (11) with exogenous growth
opportunities. As robustness check, we also present the alternative measure of growth op-
portunities based on the value added weights. Recall that GGO and GGO MA reﬂect the
industrial composition within each country in accordance with the growth opportunities
available to those industries in the global market. In this case, we obtain estimates for a
full balanced panel across all three samples. Overall the global growth opportunity measure
appears to be a strong, robust, and signiﬁcant predictor of future output and investment
growth in all samples. For example, the estimates for all countries suggest that, on aver-
age, a one standard deviation increase in global growth opportunities, that is an increase of
0.1866 in GGO MA, is associated with a 27 and 74 basis point increase in annual output
and investment growth, respectively. For the developed markets, the predictive power of the
global measure is slightly weaker than the local measure for the level measures but stronger
for the measures with a past moving average removed.
For emerging markets, the predictive power of the global measure is signiﬁcantly bet-
ter than the local measure, especially for investment growth. Except in the case of the
12GGO MA (VA) measure, the coeﬃcients are always statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. Consequently, even though emerging markets may be segmented from global capital
markets, local price information in emerging markets does a poorer job predicting future
growth opportunities than global price information. Interestingly, using value added infor-
mation about industrial composition rather than the industrial composition reﬂected in the
stock market is not helpful even though the two measures correlate quite highly for most
emerging markets. In Table 5 and future tables, we focus on the market capitalization based
measures of exogenous growth opportunities. The evidence for the value-added measures is
similar and is available upon request.
3.3 The eﬀects of ﬁnancial sector openness
Many of the countries in our sample have undergone regulatory reforms that may have im-
plications for the ability of industries to capitalize on the growth opportunities available to
them. In particular, we focus on the liberalization of the capital account, equity market,
and banking sector. Countries which are closed to foreign investors typically also restrict the
ability of their ﬁrms to raise capital abroad, preventing them from exploiting growth oppor-
tunities available to comparable industries in the global market. For example, an ADR issue
cannot happen eﬃciently as long as the domestic stock market is subject to foreign own-
ership restrictions. Consequently, we expect growth opportunities to more strongly predict
future growth in more ﬁnancially open markets.
Capital account openness
The ﬁrst panel in Table 5 presents estimates of the interaction between general capital
account openness and exogenous growth opportunities in predicting future growth. The rela-
tion between growth and capital account liberalization is itself controversial. Rodrik (1998),
Edison et al. (2002) claim that there is no correlation between capital account liberaliza-
tion and growth prospects, whereas Edwards (2001), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2004),
and Quinn and Toyoda (2001) document a positive relationship. Arteta, Eichengreen and
Wyplosz (2003) conduct robustness experiments using diﬀerent measures of openness and
13conclude that the relation between growth and capital account openness is fragile. We fo-
cus on our largest sample to maximize the cross-sectional variation in our various openness
measures.
Our measures of capital account openness are based on the IMFs Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The ﬁrst is an indicator
variable that takes on a value of zero if the country has at least one restriction in the
restrictions on payments for the capital account transactions category. The second measure,
developed by Quinn (1997) and Quinn and Toyoda (2003), attempts to measure the degree
of capital account openness; the measure is scored from 0 to 4, in half integer units, with a 4
representing a fully open economy. We transform Quinn’s measure into a 0 to 1 scale. The
measure is available for 48 of the 50 countries in our broadest sample.
For both the IMF and Quinn based measures of capital account openness, we ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcient on the interaction between GGO MA and the associated capital account openness
indicator is positive in all cases. However, the interaction coeﬃcient is never statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Equity market liberalization
In Table 5 (panel B), we explore the interaction eﬀect between the exogenous growth
opportunity measure, GGO MA, with indicators of equity market liberalization.
Our ﬁrst measure, the oﬃcial equity market liberalization indicator, is based on Bekaert
and Harvey’s (2002) detailed chronology of important ﬁnancial, economic, and political
events in many developing countries. The variable takes the value of one when it is possible
for foreign portfolio investors to own the equity of a particular country and zero other-
wise. Industrialized countries, such as the United States, are assumed to be fully liberalized
throughout our sample. Our second measure uses data on foreign ownership restrictions to
measure the degree of equity market openness. Following Bekaert (1995) and Edison and
Warnock (2003), the measure is based upon the ratio of the market capitalization of the IFC
investable to the IFC global indices in each country. The IFC’s global stock index seeks to
represent the local stock market whereas the investable index corrects the market capital-
14ization for foreign ownership restrictions. Hence, a ratio of one means that all of the stocks
in the local market are available to foreigners. Accordingly, ®i;1;t is a linear function of ei-
ther the 0/1 indicator associated with oﬃcial equity market liberalization or the continuous
measure on the [0,1] interval capturing the degree of equity market openness.8
In contrast to the evidence for general capital account liberalization presented above,
the link between growth opportunities and future output and investment growth is much
stronger in economies that permit a greater degree of equity investment.9 The interaction
coeﬃcient is always statistically signiﬁcant, both for the oﬃcial equity market liberalization
indicator and the liberalization intensity. The constant term is still positive, but no longer
signiﬁcant. This evidence suggests that there is a strong association between the ability to
exploit global growth opportunities and the degree of foreign investor access to the domestic
equity market.
Banking openness
Finally, in Panel C of Table 5, we introduce a 0/1 indicator variable that captures periods
when foreign banks are allowed to enter the domestic market either through the establishment
of branches or subsidiaries or through the acquisition of local banks. Using a variety of
sources, we have been able to determine important regulatory changes aﬀecting foreign banks
in 41 of our 50 countries over the past 23 years. The regression involving this new indicator
therefore reﬂects a slightly smaller sample. The foreign banking liberalization indicator is
equal to zero before and equal to one during and after the year of banking liberalization.
Diﬀerent from recent studies that have explored the eﬀect of the presence of foreign banks
onto the eﬃciency and stability of the local banking sector (e.g. Claessens, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt,
and Huizinga (2001)), our indicator variable is related to the regulatory environment foreign
banks face with respect to establishing or expanding their operations in a local market.
Unless foreign banks are allowed to enter a local market, we consider a country as closed
8As a robustness check, we included year ﬁxed eﬀects. These indicator variables are not signiﬁcant and
do not alter the conclusions. These results are available on request.
9Chari and Henry (2004) use ﬁrm-level data in 11 emerging markets and show that the growth rate in
the capital stock increases on average following equity market liberalizations.
15with respect to foreign banks, even if some foreign banks are already present in that country.
We also construct a ﬁrst sign indicator that changes from zero to one when a country takes a
substantial ﬁrst steps to improve access for foreign banks. Appendix table A2 lists the year
of the banking liberalization for each of 41 countries.
Similar to the equity market liberalization eﬀect, there is a strong association between
the opening of the banking sector to foreign banks and the ability to exploit exogenous
growth opportunities. The interaction coeﬃcients between both of the banking liberalization
indicators and growth opportunities are always positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
3.4 Exogenous Growth Opportunities, Financial Development, Investor Pro-
tection, and Political Risk
There are many other country characteristics that may eﬀectively segment markets, or pre-
vent aligning growth opportunities with actual growth. First, we consider interaction eﬀects
with three important measures of domestic ﬁnancial development: the ratio of private credit
to GDP (banking development), equity market turnover and the ratio of equity market
capitalization to GDP (both measures of equity market development). A vast literature doc-
uments a signiﬁcant relationship between domestic banking development (for example, King
and Levine (1993)) or stock market development (for example, Atje and Jovanovic (1989))
and economic growth. Table 6 (panel A) examines the role of the banking sector by adding
an interaction term with the private credit ratio to the regression. The coeﬃcient on the
interaction with the private credit ratio enters positively for both output and investment
growth, and is signiﬁcant at the 10% and 5% levels for each, respectively. In Table 6, we also
add, as additional interaction variables, equity market turnover (a measure of trading activ-
ity) and equity market capitalization scaled by GDP (a measure of the raw equity market
size relative to the overall economy). The results show that the coeﬃcients on turnover and
size are actually negative in three of the four cases presented, but statistically insigniﬁcant
for both output and investment growth in all cases. Together, this evidence suggests that
domestic banking development is important for exploiting growth opportunities, but stock
16market development is not. This stands in contrast to the evidence presented above on stock
market openness.
Interestingly, this ﬁnding directly conﬁrms the results in Fisman and Love (2004). They
postulate that the relation between actual growth in an industry in a particular country
and its growth opportunities should be stronger depending on the level of ﬁnancial devel-
opment in the country. They test this hypothesis without measuring growth opportunities
by investigating the correlation of industry growth rates across countries. They ﬁnd that
countries have correlated intersectoral growth rates only if both countries have high private
bank credit to GDP ratios. Other measures of ﬁnancial development do not yield signiﬁcant
results.
The Fisman-Love test assumes the existence of globally correlated shocks, but ignores the
presence of international capital ﬂows. It is conceivable that international ﬂows are the mech-
anism behind the correlation in cross-country sectoral growth rates not that these countries
simply have well functioning ﬁnancial markets. Panel D provides some exploratory analysis
of this issue. We split up our observations into four groups. First, we sort observations
into below or above median ﬁnancial development, using the private credit to GDP ratio,
then into ﬁnancially open and closed using the oﬃcial equity market openness indicator.
We regress GDP and investment growth on our measure of growth opportunities interacted
with an indicator variable for each of the four groups. The results overwhelmingly support
the idea that it is openness that drives the alignment of growth opportunities with growth,
not ﬁnancial development. Even in market with poor ﬁnancial development, the interaction
coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant as long as the country has a liberalized equity market. The
GDP growth interaction coeﬃcients are at least twice as large for open versus closed equity
markets.10 Not surprisingly, a Wald test strongly rejects the equality of the open versus
closed coeﬃcients, while it fails to reject the equality of the coeﬃcients for low versus high
ﬁnancial development.
Second, La Porta et al. (1997) have stressed the importance of investor protection and,
more generally, the quality of institutions and the legal environment as sources for cross-
10Note that these results are unchanged when the sorting is done ﬁrst on ﬁnancial development.
17country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development. We can directly investigate the eﬀect of investor
protection on the ability to exploit growth opportunities by interacting our growth oppor-
tunity measure with a measure of investor protection.
One of the major advantages of our framework is the panel setup, but unfortunately most
measures of investor protection or the quality of (legal) institutions have no time dimension.
We therefore use two measures obtained from ICRG’s political risk ratings, Law and Order
and a broader measure of the Quality of Institutions that reﬂects corruption, law and order,
and bureaucratic quality. We also consider a 0/1 indicator that takes a value one after the
ﬁrst insider trading prosecution in each country (see Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)). Panel
B in Table 6 shows that investor protection itself does not seem to better align growth oppor-
tunities with growth. The highest t-statistic (1.70) occurs for the investment growth equation
in relation to Law and Order. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) suggest that improvements in
investor protection have very diﬀerent eﬀects in open and closed economies. In particular,
entrepreneurs suﬀer less from an improvement in investor protection under perfect capital
mobility than under segmentation. Their analysis also predicts that entrepreneurs will be
more opposed to improvements in investor protection where capital markets are closed to
capital ﬂows. Within our framework, their model would predict a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect
of investor protection with growth opportunities in open economies. We repeat the analysis
over four sub-groups that we did for ﬁnancial development for the Law and Order variable,
also in panel D of Table 6. We ﬁnd that the marginal eﬀect of improved Law and Order
in aligning growth opportunities with growth is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Again,
openness is more important both economically and statistically. Note that investor protec-
tion is likely to be priced and reﬂected in country-speciﬁc price earnings ratios (see La Porta
et al. (1997) and Albuquerque and Wang (2004)). However, our analysis in Table 6 uses
an exogenous growth opportunities measure, so it is not inﬂuenced by any country-speciﬁc
factors.
Finally, we note that the Law and Order measures are part of the ICRG’s political
risk rating. Political risk may eﬀectively segment capital markets (see Bekaert (1995)).
It is well known that some institutional investors have guidelines that prohibit them from
18investing in the equity markets of certain risky countries. For example, CalPERS, a large U.S.
pension fund, has a Permissable Country Program, which explicitly weights political risk in
determining whether a county is a permissable investment. Similarly, high levels of political
risk may discourage foreign direct investment. In panel C, we consider the overall ICRG
political risk rating - a composite of twelve subindices ranging from political conditions,
the quality of institutions, socioeconomic conditions and conﬂict - and a measure of the
investment proﬁle in each country. The Investment Proﬁle reﬂects the risk of expropriation,
contract viability, payment delays, and the ability to repatriate proﬁts. This measure is most
closely correlated with political risks relevant for FDI.
The evidence suggests that high values for the political risk and the investment proﬁle
indices (larger numbers denote improved conditions) are associated with a greater ability to
exploit exogenous growth opportunities. The overall positive coeﬃcient of the political risk
rating is not due to the quality of institutions variable (in panel B), but rather to those aspects
of the legal and regulatory environment that directly relate to the stability and security of
inward investment. This analysis generally conﬁrms the importance of international capital
ﬂows in aligning growth opportunities with growth.
4 Growth Opportunities and Market Integration
4.1 Econometric framework
In Table 4, we presented evidence that exogenous growth opportunities predict future output
and investment growth. Table 5 shows that the degree of predictability increases with equity
market and banking sector openness. In this section, we link this predictability to tests of
market integration. First, we explore whether the diﬀerential between local and exogenous
growth opportunities predicts future growth in excess of world growth. Under full market
integration, this should not be the case. That is, we test the null of market integration.
Second, we explore whether the diﬀerential between exogenous and world average growth
opportunities predicts future growth. In integrated market, countries that contain high (low)
PE industries should growth at a faster (slower) rate than the rest of the world. In other
19words, we test the null of market segmentation. Lastly, we explore what factors contribute
to the ability of countries to take advantage of global growth opportunities. In particular,
we investigate interaction eﬀects between excess exogenous growth opportunities and capital
account, equity market, and banking sector openness and liberalization.
To explore these questions, the regressions we consider are
yi;t+k;k ¡ yw;t+k;k = ®i;0 + ®1;tLEGO MAi;t + ´i;t+k;k (12)
yi;t+k;k ¡ yw;t+k;k = ®i;0 + ®1;tGEGO MAi;t + ´i;t+k;k; (13)
where yi;t+k;k¡yw;t+k;k is the k-year average growth rate of either real per capita gross domes-
tic product or investment for country i in excess of the “world” counterpart. LEGO MAi;t
(= LGO MAi;t¡GGO MAi;t) is the diﬀerence between local and exogenous growth opportu-
nities, and GEGO MAi;t (= GGO MAi;t¡WGO MAt) is the diﬀerence between exogenous
growth opportunities and the growth opportunities measure for the world market.
4.2 Tests of market integration and segmentation
We ﬁrst present results constraining ®1;t in equations (12) and (13) to be time-invariant
constants.
4.2.1 The null of market integration
In integrated markets, (risk-adjusted) diﬀerences between local and exogenous growth op-
portunities should contain no information about future excess growth. We present results
for regression (12) in panel A of Table 7. As before, the estimates for all countries and
the emerging markets are obtained for an unbalanced panel (maximizing data availability).
For these two samples, the observed relation between local excess growth opportunities and
excess output is not signiﬁcant. The weak to insigniﬁcant predictive eﬀects may be due to
the limited time-series availability of local market PE ratios.
In sharp contrast, the predictive eﬀects of local excess growth opportunities are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant for the developed markets for which we have a full balanced sample.
This evidence suggests that, at least for this collection of countries, information contained
20in country-speciﬁc growth opportunities, as measured by the diﬀerence between local and
exogenous PE ratios, is informative about future growth. Hence, one interpretation of this
ﬁnding is that we reject the null hypothesis of market integration for the developed markets.
Here, our tests are consistent with the extant results on real quantity variables regarding
market integration, not the results obtained using price information, which are typically
favorable for the market integration hypothesis.
Given that the local growth opportunity measure has little predictive power for economic
growth in emerging markets (see Table 4), our test results for emerging markets should not
be interpreted as being in favor of market integration. In general, the main challenge we
face in exploring market integration using local price earnings ratios is the limited sample
that is available for inference. In the next section, however, we explore market integration in
a diﬀerent manner by evaluating whether excess growth opportunities measured using only
global price information, predict excess growth. One key advantage of this methodology is
that we obtain a full time series across all countries, increasing the power of our tests.
4.2.2 The null of market segmentation
In panel B of Table 7, we present evidence for the alternative regression (13) using exogenous
growth opportunities in excess of their world counterpart. In this regression, we explore the
degree to which country-speciﬁc industrial composition (relative to the world) predicts excess
output and investment growth (relative to the world). If a country has an industrial base
tilted towards high PE industries in the global market, it should grow faster than the world
average. That is, integrated countries can only grow faster than the world through an
industrial composition geared towards high growth opportunities.
For the emerging markets, none of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, and some are even nega-
tive. We fail to reject the null of market segmentation for emerging countries. Consequently,
even though we found strong predictive power of exogenous growth opportunities in the last
section, these countries are, on average, not fully exploiting the growth opportunities avail-
able from their particular industrial mix. This result suggests that linking the predictability
to the degree of openness across these markets may be fruitful, and we will do so in sec-
21tion 4.3. For developed markets (and the results are similar for all countries combined),
the coeﬃcients are robustly positive, but we only reject the null of market segmentation in
some cases, mostly for investment growth. It is likely that dividing countries into developed
and emerging markets decreases the power of our tests because we mix ﬁnancially open and
closed countries in both sub-samples. For example, according to the IMF measure, Denmark
had a closed capital account before 1988, whereas Malaysia had overall open capital markets
throughout the sample until the late 1990’s.
4.3 Exogenous growth opportunities and openness
We now re-estimate regressions (12) and (13), employing a collection of alternative openness
measures as interaction variables in ®i;1;t. For this section, we focus on our largest sample
of 50 countries in order to maximize both the cross-sectional and time-series information in
our sample. Our conjecture is that more open economies should be better poised to exploit
global growth opportunities.
Table 8 presents estimates of the interaction for both LEGO (left-hand side) and GEGO
(right-hand side) measures. The three panels correspond to diﬀerent measures of openness
as in Table 5. We start the discussion with the LEGO measure. Here, we expect the
interaction eﬀect to be negative. LEGO should not predict growth or investment when
markets are fully integrated. The interaction eﬀect is always negative for both of our capital
account openness measures (panel A) and for the banking openness measures (panel C). This
is true for both investment and output growth, but only the investment growth results are
statistically signiﬁcant. Also, for investment growth, the constant term and the interaction
term are of about the same magnitude and the constant term is signiﬁcantly positive. Hence,
for open countries LEGO does not predict relative growth, but for segmented countries it
does. For the equity liberalization measure, there are no signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, and some
coeﬃcients have the wrong sign.
For the GEGO measure, we expect the interaction eﬀect to be positive. GEGO should
predict relative growth for relatively open countries, but should not predict relative growth
for segmented countries. The results are qualitatively consistent with this hypothesis. The
22constant terms in all three panels are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. The interaction
eﬀects are invariably positive, again with stronger eﬀects for investment growth. Unfor-
tunately, the coeﬃcients often fail to be statistically signiﬁcant. We only ﬁnd statistical
signiﬁcance for the equity market liberalization indicators in the growth regressions and for
the First Sign banking sector liberalization indicator for both GDP and investment growth.
Nevertheless, the results go some way to help resolve the seemingly contradictory results
in Table 7. For the developed markets, we reject market integration, yet other tests suggested
a rejection of market segmentation. For our largest sample, the evidence presented in Table
8 points towards (at least for some of our tests) a greater likelihood of market integration
for countries that are more open. Such a mixed outcome is consistent with partial or time-
varying integration where the ability to capitalize on world growth opportunities depends
critically on country-speciﬁc factors. Our results show that our various measures of openness
help diﬀerentiate countries along this dimension, but we are likely still omitting important
factors.
5 Conclusions
Our research proposes a simple measure of country-speciﬁc growth opportunities based on
price to earnings (PE) ratios set in global stock markets. To do so, we combine information
about a country’s industrial composition and the growth opportunities contained in global
prices that each of these industries face. Importantly, we ﬁnd that this measure of exogenous
growth opportunities predicts future output and investment growth, and that the degree of
predictability is positively associated with several measures of openness.
Next, we formulate a test of market integration based on the idea that if these growth
opportunities are indeed globally priced and exploited, the diﬀerence between local and
global price-earnings ratios should not predict the relative growth performance of a country.
We present evidence that suggests a rejection of this hypothesis for developed countries but
the test lacks power for a wider sample of countries. Conversely, in integrated markets, the
diﬀerence in industrial composition relative to the world multiplied with world price earnings
23ratios should be a main driver of relative growth, as it should be the countries with the high
PE ratio industries that capture the highest growth rates. Even though we have more data
for this test, we ﬁnd mixed evidence on the test of the null of market segmentation. For
emerging markets, we fail to reject the null of market segmentation.
Of course, in reality the degree of integration varies across countries and across time. To
allow for the possibility of a time-varying, country-speciﬁc ability to exploit global growth
opportunities, we interact our measure of excess global growth opportunities with a number
of measures capturing varying degrees of openness such as capital account, equity market,
and banking sector liberalizations. Importantly, we ﬁnd evidence that suggests a greater
likelihood of market integration in more open economies; however, the evidence is not entirely
uniform across openness measures and the relevant coeﬃcients are not always statistically
signiﬁcant.
In future work, we plan to more accurately measure the variation in the degree of inte-
gration over time and its eﬀect on the ability to exploit growth opportunities. For example,
every additional country opening its capital markets (allowing both inward and outward
investment) should enhance the overall ability to exploit global growth opportunities.
Of course, there is a large list of factors that may eﬀectively segment or help integrate
countries into the world economy. In our research, we investigate measures of ﬁnancial
development, investor protection, and political risk. Banking development, as in Fisman and
Love (2004), shows a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect with growth opportunities. Our results also
suggest that the existing literature is omitting a critically relevant variable. Financial market
openness seems a more important determinant of the ability to exploit growth opportunities
than is ﬁnancial development. In future work, we plan to investigate whether international
capital in the form of FDI and portfolio ﬂows indeed “follows” growth opportunities. This
research may usefully complement recent work by Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2004), who
have argued that FDI is mostly driven by cheap capital in host countries.
246 Appendix A: Price-Earnings Ratios and Growth Opportunities
We consider a simple present value model under the null of ﬁnancial market integration. We
begin by deﬁning log earnings growth, ∆ln(EAt), with EAt the earnings level, in country i,
industry j as:
∆ln(EAi;j;t) = °i;jGOw;j;t¡1 + ²i;j;t: (14)
Earnings growth is aﬀected by world-wide growth opportunities in industry j, deﬁned as
GOw;j;t and an idiosyncratic noise term which we assume to be N(0;¾2
i;j). In the solution
presented above, we assume °i;j = 1, but we provide the more general solution below. Growth
opportunities themselves follow a persistent stochastic process:
GOw;j;t = ¹j + 'jGOw;j;t¡1 + ²w;j;t: (15)
We assume ²w;j;t » N(0;¾2
w;j). Under the hypothesis of market integration, the discount rate
for each industry in each country is simply a multiple of the world discount rate:
±i;j;t = rf(1 ¡ ¯i;j) + ¯i;j±w;t: (16)
The constant term, with rf equal to the risk free rate, arises because the discount rates are
total not excess discount rates. An equation like (16) would follow from a logarithmic version
of the standard world CAPM. The world discount rate process follows:
±w;t = dw + Áw±w;t¡1 + ´w;t; (17)
with ´w;t » N(0;s2
w). An important assumption is that under the null of market integration,
industries in diﬀerent countries face the same discount rate; that is,
¯i;j = ¯j: (18)
Suppose that each industry pays out all earnings, EAt, each period, then the valuation of








Given that we model earnings growth as in equation (14), the earnings process is non-
stationary. We must scale the current valuation by earnings, and impose a transversality















25Note that for k = 1,
Qi;j;1;t = Et[exp(¡±i;j;t + ∆ln(EAi;j;t+1))]







Qi;j;k;t = exp(ai;j;k + bi;j;k±w;t + ci;j;kGOw;j;t): (22)
Although a full closed-form solution can be found, for our purposes it suﬃces to characterize









= Et[exp(¡±i;j;t + ∆ln(EAi;j;t+1) + ai;j;k + bi;j;k±w;t+1 + ci;j;kGOw;j;t+1)]: (23)
Consequently,
exp(ai;j;k+1 + bi;j;k+1±w;t + ci;j;k+1GOw;j;t)







+(°i;j + ci;j;k'j)GOw;j;t + (¡¯i;j + bi;j;kÁw)±w;tg: (24)
Hence, matching coeﬃcients, we ﬁnd:














bi;j;k+1 = ¡¯i;j + bi;j;kÁw (26)
ci;j;k+1 = °i;j + ci;j;k'j: (27)
(28)
Because of the assumption (18), we can write bi;j;k+1 = bj;k+1. Also, the country dependence
in growth opportunities hinges entirely on °i;j. We assume that in a fully integrated world
°i;j = °j = 1: (29)
That is, earnings growth in a particular industry should not depend on the country in which
the industry is located. If that is the case, it is logical to assume that °j is 1 because growth
opportunities are industry speciﬁc. Bringing everything together, we ﬁnd that the price




exp(ai;j;k + bj;k±w;t + cj;kGOw;j;t) (30)
26An improvement in growth opportunities revises price earnings ratios for the industry
upward everywhere in the world, and the change in the PE-ratio is larger when GOw;j;t is
more persistent. Similarly, a reduction in the world discount rate increases the PE-ratio with
the magnitude of the response depending upon the persistence of the discount rate process
and the beta of the industry. Equation (30) can be linearized around the mean values for
±w;t and GOw;j;t leading to the expression in the text (equation (4)).
277 Appendix B: Constructing Measures of Growth Opportunities
Local Growth Opportunities
LGO as deﬁned in (5) is approximately the log of the market PE ratio of a given country.
We collect PE ratios from Datastream for the last day of each month. Thirteen of our 50
countries are not covered by Datastream and we use PE ratios from IFC instead. For Italy,
Norway, Spain, and Sweden, we use data from MSCI to exploit the longer time series com-
pared to Datastream. In a few cases, we encounter negative PE ratios. We replace those
by the maximum PE ratio observed up to that point. The latter is in no case larger than
100. Table A1 reports for each country which data are used to construct LGO and in which
month the coverage begins.
Exogenous Global Growth Opportunities
GGO as deﬁned in (6) is the log of the inner product of the vector of global industry PE
ratios and the vector of lagged country-speciﬁc industry weights. While Datastream is the
only source for the global industry PE ratios, we use diﬀerent sources to derive country-
speciﬁc industry weights, in particular we use Datastream as well as IFC data to derive
an industry’s relative market capitalization, our principal measure of industry-weights, and
UNIDO data to derive an industry’s relative value added (VA), an alternative measure of
industry-weights. For each of these measures, technical appendices that describe how we
match the diﬀerent industry classiﬁcations are available upon request.
Market capitalization based industry weights
For 21 out of the 50 countries in our sample we combine the market values for 35 industrial
sectors covered by Datastream with the corresponding global PE ratios for the same 35
industries.11 Note that the market capitalizations reﬂect information as of December 31 of
the previous year with respect to the information contained in the PE ratios.12
For the remaining 29 countries, we derive industry weights from market capitalization
data reported by IFC. IFC employs the 2-digit SIC classiﬁcation, with 82 industry groups.
To combine these industry weights with the global industry PE ratios from Datastream, we
link the 101 industrial sub-sectors from Datastream to the 82 SIC groups, obtaining global
PE ratios for each SIC group.13 Whenever more than one Datastream sub-sector is included
in an SIC group, we calculate the weighted average of the PE ratios of the entering sub-
11Datastream uses the FTSE industry classiﬁcation with 35 industrial sectors (level 3 in Datastream) and
101 sub-sectors (level 5 in Datastream). For a detailed description see “FTSE Global Classiﬁcation System”,
available at http://www.ftse.com.
12If t = May 1985 and GGOi;t = ln[IW 0
i;t¡1PEw;t], the industry weights, IWi;t¡1, will reﬂect the industrial
composition in country i as of December 31, 1984, while the global industry PE ratios, PEw;t, reﬂect
information as of May 31, 1985. The only exceptions to this rule are 1973, where the industry weights are
as of December 31, 1973, and cases where the Datastream country coverage starts after 1973. If Datastream
coverage for a speciﬁc country starts after 1973, we use the earliest available observation for the previous
years without observations. See Table A1 for details.
13For the Datastream sub-sector “Mortgage Finance” we replace the PE ratio between December 1981
and February 1983 by the PE ratio of the industrial sector “Spc. and Other Finance” (after adjusting its
level appropriately), as the original PE ratio takes on extreme values of up to 1,976.
28sectors using the sub-sectors’ market values as of December 31 of the same year. Industry
weights again reﬂect information as of December 31 of the previous year with respect to the
information contained in the PE ratios.14
Value added (VA) based industry weights
As an alternative to the market capitalization based weights, we also derive industry weights
from an industry’s relative value added. We obtain annual value added data for 28 manufac-
turing industries, classiﬁed according to the 3-digit ISIC (rev. 2), from the UNIDO Industrial
Statistics Database starting in 1973. Since the UNIDO database contains information only
on the manufacturing sector, industry weights are calculated relative to the value added of
the manufacturing sector. To combine these industry weights with the global industry PE
ratios from Datastream, we link the 101 industrial sub-sectors from Datastream to the 28
ISIC manufacturing industries, obtaining global PE ratios for each ISIC group. Whenever
more than one Datastream sub-sector is included in an ISIC group, we calculate the weighted
average of the PE ratios of the entering sub-sectors using the sub-sectors’ market values as
of December 31 of the same year. Industry weights again reﬂect information as of December
31 of the previous year with respect to the information contained in the PE ratios.15
World Growth Opportunities
WGO as deﬁned in (8) is approximately the log of the PE ratio of the world market. The
world market PE ratio for the last of each month is collected from January 1973 until De-
cember 2002 from Datastream.
Measures of Excess Growth Opportunities
For the construction of LEGO we use the market capitalization based measure of global
growth opportunities, GGO. We construct GEGO by subtracting WGO from GGO.
Moving Average Correction
By subtracting a 60-month moving average from each original series we obtain adjusted series
which we denote by the extension “ MA”. For example, LGO MA is calculated as:






GGO MA,GGO MA(V A), LEGO MA, GEGO MA and GEGO MA(V A) are calculated
analogously.
14The only exceptions to this rule are the years 1973 through 1975, where the industry weights are as
of December 31, 1975, cases where IFC country coverage starts after 1975, and values for 2001 where the
industry weights are as of December 31, 2000. If IFC coverage for a speciﬁc country starts after 1975, we
use the earliest available observation for the previous years without observations. See Table A1 for details.
15The only exceptions to this rule are cases where UNIDO country coverage starts after 1973, and values
for 1999 through 2001 where the industry weights are same as in 1998. If UNIDO coverage for a speciﬁc
country starts after 1973, we again use the earliest available observation for the previous years without
observations. See Table A1 for details.
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32Table 1
Predictive Power of Growth Opportunity Measures in Integrated and Segmented Markets
Definition Market Integration Market Segmentation
LGO is a local measure of country-specific growth 
opportunities. LGO is the weighted sum of a country's 
industry PE ratios. The weights are the relative capitalization 
of industries within the country. It is expressed in logs.
GGO is a global measure of growth opportunities, i.e. 
country-specific growth opportunities implied by the global 
market. GGO is the weighted sum of global industry PE 
ratios. The weights are determined by relative market 
capitalization. It is expressed in logs.
GGO predicts economic growth, 
since LGO and GGO move closely 
together.
GGO does not predict economic 
growth, since global prices are not 
relevant for local markets.
LEGO is a local measure of country-specific growth 
opportunities in excess of world growth opportunities. LEGO 
is the difference between LGO and GGO.
LEGO does not predict economic 
growth in excess of world growth 
since it is zero or constant.
LEGO predicts economic growth in 
excess of world economic growth. 
Local and global prices contain 
different information.
GEGO is a global measure of country-specific growth 
opportunities in excess of world growth opportunities. GEGO 
is the difference between GGO and the log of the world 
market PE ratio (WGO). GEGO is different from zero when a 
country's industry composition differs from the world's 
industry composition.
GEGO predicts economic growth in 
excess of world economic growth. 
Differences in industry composition 
are the only factors leading to 
differences in economic growth.
GEGO does not predict economic 
growth, since global prices are not 
relevant for local markets.
For each growth opportunity measure we state its ability to predict economic growth under the two opposing assumptions of market integration and 
segmentation.
Predicting Economic Growth
LGO predicts economic growth independently from the degree of market 
integration.Table 2
Description of the Variables
All data are employed at the annual frequency.
Variable Description
LGO and LGO_MA LGO and LGO_MA are local measures of country-specific growth opportunities. LGO is the log of a 
country's market PE ratio. LGO_MA is LGO less a 60-month moving average. For a subset of 17 
developed countries, both variables are available from 1980 through 2002. For the other countries, starting 
points vary. For details see Appendix B. Source: Datastream, S&P Emerging Markets Data Base, MSCI.
GGO and GGO_MA GGO and GGO_MA are global measures of country-specific growth opportunities. GGO is the log of the 
inner product of the vector of global industry PE ratios and the vector of country-specific industry weights. 
Country-specific industry weights are determine by relative market capitalization.  We also investigate an 
alternative set of weights based on the relative value added (VA) of the industries in a country. GGO_MA 
is GGO less a 60-month moving average. Available for all 50 countries from 1980 through 2002. See 
Appendix B for details. Source: Datastream, S&P Emerging Markets Data Base, UNIDO Industrial 
Statistics Database
LEGO and LEGO_MA LEGO and LEGO_MA are local measures of country-specific growth opportunities in excess of world 
growth opportunities. LEGO is the difference between LGO and GGO. LEGO_MA is LEGO less a 60-
month moving average. For sample II (17 countries) both variables are available from 1980 through 2002.  
For other countries, starting points vary. See Appendix B for details. Source: Datastream, S&P Emerging 
Markets Data Base, MSCI.
GEGO and GEGO_MA GEGO and GEGO_MA are global measures of country-specific growth opportunities in excess of world 
growth opportunities. GEGO is the difference between GGO and WGO, the log of the world market price 
to earnings ratio.  GEGO_MA is GEGO less a 60-month moving average. Available for all 50 countries 
from 1980 through 2002.  See Appendix B for details. Source: Datastream, S&P Emerging Markets Data 
Base, UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database
Gross domestic product (GDP) growth Growth of real per capita gross domestic product. Available for all countries from 1980 through 2002. 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators CD-ROM.
Investment growth Growth of real per capita gross fixed capital formation, which includes land improvements (fences, ditches,
drains, and so on), plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and 
the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial 
buildings.  Available for all countries from 1980 through 2002. Source: World Bank Development 
Indicators  CD-ROM.
Measures of Openness
IMF Capital account liberalization indicator We measure capital account openness by employing the the IMF's   Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions  (AREAER).  This publication reports six categories of 
information.  The capital account liberalization indicator takes on value of zero if the country has at least 
one restriction in the "restrictions on payments for the capital account transaction" category.
Quinn Capital account liberalization indicator Quinn’s capital account openness measure is also created from the text of the annual volume published by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.   Rather 
than the indicator constructed by the IMF that takes a 1 if any restriction is in place, Quinn’s openness 
measure is scored 0-4, in half integer units, with 4 representing a fully open economy.  The measure hence 
facilitates a more nuanced view of capital account openness, and is available for 48 countries in our study.  
We transform the measure into a 0 to 1 scale.
Official equity market liberalization indicator Corresponding to a date of formal regulatory change after which foreign investors officially have the 
opportunity to invest in domestic equity securities. Official Liberalization dates are based on Bekaert and 
Harvey (2002) A Chronology of Important Financial, Economic and Political Events in Emerging 
Markets,   http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/chronology.htm. This chronology is based on over 50 different 
source materials. A condensed version of the chronology, along with the selection of dates for a number of 
countries appears in Bekaert and Harvey (2000).  We have extended their official liberalization dates to 
include Japan, New Zealand, and Spain. For the liberalizing countries, the associated official liberalization 
indicator takes a value of one when the equity market is officially liberalized and thereafter, and zero 
otherwise.  For the remaining countries, fully segmented countries are assumed to have an indicator value 
of zero, and fully liberalized countries are assumed to have an indicator value of one. These dates appear 
in Appendix Table A2.Table 2
(Continued)
Variable Description
Intensity equity market liberalization indicator Following Bekaert (1995) and Edison and Warnock (2003), the intensity measure is based on the ratio of 
the market capitalization of the constituent firms comprising the IFC Investable index to those that 
comprise the IFC Global index for each country.  The IFC Global index, subject to some exclusion 
restrictions, is designed to represent the overall market portfolio for each country, whereas the IFC 
Investable index is designed to represent a portfolio of domestic equities that are available to foreign 
investors.  A ratio of one means that all of the stocks are available to foreign investors.  Fully segmented 
countries have an intensity measure of zero, and fully liberalized countries have an intensity measure of 
one.
Foreign banking liberalization indicator Using a variety of sources (e.g. National Treatment Study, Fitch Ratings Country Reports, interviews with 
local regulatory bodies), we determine when foreign banks gain access to the domestic banking market 
through the establishment of branches or subsidiaries or through the acquisition of local banks. The Foreign
banking liberalization indicator is equal to zero before and equal to one during and after the year of 
banking liberalization. We also construct a First Sign indicator that changes from zero to one when a 
country takes substantial first steps to improve access for  foreign banks. Both indicator variables are 
available for 41 countries. Banking liberalization dates appear in Appendix Table A2.
Financial Development and Political Risk
Private credit/GDP Private credit divided by gross domestic product. Credit to private sector refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits 
and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.  Available for all countries from 1980 
through 2002. Source: World Bank Development Indicators  CD-ROM.
Equity market turnover The ratio of equity market value traded to the market capitalization.  The data are available for 50 
countries from 1980 through 2002. Source: Standard and Poor's/International Finance Corporation's  
Emerging Stock Markets Factbook.
Equity market size  The ratio of equity market value capitalization to GDP.  The data are available for 50 countries from 1980 
through 2002. Source: Standard and Poor's/International Finance Corporation's  Emerging Stock Markets 
Factbook.
Quality of Institutions The sum of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Political Risk (ICRGP) subcomponents: 
Corruption, Law and Order, and Bureaucratic Quality.
Law and Order ICRG political risk sub-component. PRS assesses Law and Order separately, with each sub-component 
comprising zero to three points.  The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality 
of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law.  
Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating (3.0) in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating (1.0) if the law
is ignored for a political aim.
Insider trading law indicator Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) document the first prosecution of insider trading laws.  The indicator 
variable takes the value of one following the the insider trading law's first prosecution.
Political risk rating The value of the the Political Risk Service (PRS) Group’s political risk rating indicator which ranges 
between 0 (high risk) and 100 (low risk).  The risk rating is a combination of 12 subcomponents.  The data 
are available from 1984 through 2002.  For each country, we backfill the 1984 value to 1980. Source: 
Various issues of the International Country Risk Guide.
Investment Profile ICRG political risk sub-component (12% weight). This is a measure of the government’s attitude to inward 
investment.  The investment profile is determined by PRS's assessment of three sub-components: (i) risk of 
expropriation or contract viability; (ii) payment delays; and (iii) repatriation of profits. Each sub-
component is scored on a scale  from zero (very high risk) to four (very low risk).Table 3
Summary Statistics: LGO, GGO, LEGO, and GEGO
1980 - 2002 - Annual Frequency
Panel A: Measures of Growth Opportunities
Mean Standard Deviation
Sample Country
LGO GGO     LEGO GEGO LGO GGO LEGO GEGO
World 2.902 - - - 0.298 - - -
I Sample I: All Countries 2.720 2.932 -0.339 0.030 0.583 0.295 0.522 0.150
II Sample II: Developed 2.794 2.945 -0.208 0.044 0.518 0.288 0.369 0.128
III Sample III: Emerging 2.601 2.911 -0.494 0.009 0.617 0.298 0.599 0.152



















World 0.082 - - - 0.177 - - -
I Sample I: All Countries 0.036 0.071 -0.016 -0.011 0.396 0.198 0.381 0.102
II Sample II: Developed 0.057 0.072 -0.016 -0.010 0.281 0.192 0.239 0.090
III Sample III: Emerging -0.004 0.071 -0.023 -0.011 0.506 0.200 0.519 0.105














I Sample I: All Countries 0.252 0.298 0.870 0.273 0.323 0.857
II Sample II: Developed 0.498 0.560 0.903 0.484 0.545 0.882
III Sample III: Emerging 0.097 0.103 0.866 0.048 0.117 0.852
Table 3 presents summary statistics for our unadjusted and moving-average adjusted growth opportunity measures, averaged over different 
country groups.  Data are not available for all years. For a definition of the different measures for growth opportunities, LGO, WGO, and  GGO, 
including the growth opportunities measures with the MA-Adjustment, see Appendix B.  
Growth Opportunities Growth Opportunities with MA-AdjustmentTable 4
Growth Predictability
Annual Average Real GDP and Investment Growth (Five-year horizon)
1980-2002
Panel A: Local Growth Opportunities
All Countries Developed Emerging All Countries Developed Emerging
LGO 0.0026 0.0072 0.0017 0.0071 0.0256 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0017) (0.0044) (0.0042)
LGO_MA 0.0043 0.0097 0.0040 0.0154 0.0279 0.0118
(0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0125) (0.0040) (0.0062) (0.0075)
Panel B: Exogenous (Implied) Global Growth Opportunities
All Countries Developed Emerging All Countries Developed Emerging
GGO 0.0070 0.0033 0.0131 0.0408 0.0211 0.0704
(0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0060) (0.0085) (0.0080)
GGO_MA 0.0142 0.0163 0.0106 0.0397 0.0489 0.0223
(0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0071) (0.0102) (0.0112)
GGO (VA) 0.0081 0.0061 0.0117 0.0347 0.0252 0.0552
(0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0055) (0.0072) (0.0089)
GGO_MA (VA) 0.0101 0.0114 0.0056 0.0235 0.0345 0.0052
(0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0056) (0.0075) (0.0088)
The samples included reflect 50 (all), 17 (developed), and 30 (emerging) countries detailed in the data appendix.  The dependent variables are either 
the 5-year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product or investment.  We include in the regressions, but do not report, fixed effect
We report the coefficient on the lagged growth opportunities measure.  In Panel A, we measure local growth opportunities.  For the full sample and 
the emerging markets, these regressions are unbalanced based on data availability.  In Panel B, we measure exogenous growth opportunities.  We 
also report evidence for the alternative value added (VA) industry weights.  The weighting matrix we employ in our GMM estimation provides a 
correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.  All standard errors in parentheses account for the overlapping nature of the data.  
GDP growth Investment growth
GDP growth Investment growthTable 5
Exogenous Growth Opportunities and Openness
Annual Average Real GDP and Investment Growth (Five-year horizon)
50 countries: 1980-2002
Panel A: Capital Account Openness Panel B: Equity Market Openness Panel C: Banking Sector Openness
GDP Investment GDP Investment GDP Investment
GGO_MA 0.0123 0.0325 GGO_MA 0.0061 0.0143 GGO_MA 0.0074 0.0171
(0.0029) (0.0084) (0.0037) (0.0120) (0.0042) (0.0116)
GGO_MA*Capital Account 





(0.0044) (0.0137) (0.0044) (0.0141) (0.0048) (0.0145)
GGO_MA 0.0060 0.0167 GGO_MA 0.0063 0.0118 GGO_MA 0.0072 0.0071
(0.0053) (0.0171) (0.0037) (0.0113) (0.0049) (0.0130)
GGO_MA*Capital Account 
Degree of Openness (Quinn) 0.0105 0.0343
GGO_MA*Equity Market Degree 
of Openness 0.0127 0.0439
GGO_MA*Banking Sector 
Liberalization (First Sign) 0.0107 0.0475
(0.0074) (0.0242) (0.0045) (0.0142) (0.0053) (0.0147)
The sample includes 50 developed and emerging countries detailed in the data appendix.  The dependent variables are either the 5-year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product 
or investment.  We include in the regressions, but do not report, fixed effects.  We measure exogenous growth opportunities as GGO_MA.  We report the coefficient on the growth opportunities 
measure and interaction terms with 1) a 0/1 indicator of capital account openness from the IMF, 2) a continuous measure of the degree of capital account openness from Quinn (only 48 countries are 
available), 3) official equity market liberalization from Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2004), 4) the degree of equity market openness (investability), and 5) two indicators of banking sector 
liberalization -- opening the banking sector to foreign banks (given data limitations, this regression covers only 41 countries).  The weighting matrix we employ in our GMM estimation provides a 
correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.  All standard errors in parentheses account for the overlapping nature of the data. Table 6
Exogenous Growth Opportunities, Financial Development, Investor Protection, and Political Risk
Annual Average Real GDP and Investment Growth (Five-year horizon)
50 countries: 1980-2002
Panel A: Financial Development      Panel B: Investor Protection       Panel C: Political Risk     
GDP Investment GDP Investment GDP Investment
GGO_MA 0.0067 0.0114 GGO_MA 0.0079 0.0070 GGO_MA -0.0064 -0.0212
(0.0042) (0.0126) (0.0060) (0.0203) (0.0091) (0.0291)
GGO_MA*Private Credit     0.0116 0.0408 GGO_MA*Law and Order (ICRG)     0.0084 0.0429 GGO_MA*Political Risk (ICRG)     0.0289 0.0850
(0.0060) (0.0166) (0.0075) (0.0252) (0.0124) (0.0394)
GGO_MA 0.0167 0.0488 GGO_MA 0.0096 0.0133 GGO_MA 0.0002 -0.2092
(0.0027) (0.0089) (0.0074) (0.0230) (0.0071) (0.0231)
GGO_MA*Equity Market Turnover     -0.0084 -0.0307 GGO_MA*Quality of Institutions (ICRG)     0.0060 0.0350 GGO_MA*Investment Profile (ICRG)     0.0226 0.0968
(0.0053) (0.0191) (0.0093) (0.0291) (0.0115) (0.0366)
GGO_MA 0.0142 0.0378 GGO_MA 0.0143 0.0402
(0.0027) (0.0082) (0.0023) (0.0072)
GGO_MA*Equity Market Size     -0.0021 0.0054 GGO_MA*Insider Trading Prosecution     -0.0016 -0.0026
(0.0064) (0.0194) (0.0057) (0.0183)
Panel D: Openness, Financial Development, and Law and Order     
GDP Investment GDP Investment
Low Private Credit/Closed Equity Market     0.0063 0.0074 Low Law and Order/Closed Equity Market    0.0062 0.0134
(0.0041) (0.0124) (0.0038) (0.0122)
Low Private Credit/Open Equity Market     0.0220 0.0537 Low Law and Order/Open Equity Market    0.0173 0.0367
(0.0040) (0.0142) (0.0058) (0.0177)
High Private Credit/Closed Equity Market    0.0063 0.0374 High Law and Order/Closed Equity Market   0.0073 0.0167
(0.0066) (0.0262) (0.0187) (0.0522)
High Private Credit/Open Equity Market    0.0152 0.0489 High Law and Order/Open Equity Market    0.0183 0.0544
(0.0029) (0.0089) (0.0026) (0.0086)
Wald Tests:      Wald Tests:     
    Closed versus Open      15.17*** 10.17***     Closed versus Open      6.10** 1.47
    Low versus High Private Credit     1.60 2.56    Low versus High Law and Order    0.02 0.40
The sample includes 50 developed and emerging countries detailed in the data appendix.  The dependent variables are either the 5-year average growth rate of real per capita gross 
domestic product or investment.  We include in the regressions, but do not report, fixed effects.  We measure exogenous growth opportunities as GGO_MA.  We report the coefficient 
on the growth opportunities measure and interaction terms with financial development (Panel A): 1) the ratio of private credit to GDP, 2) equity market turnover, 3) the ratio of equity 
market capitalization to GDP; Investor Protection (Panel B): 1) the ICRG law and order subcomponent, 2) the ICRG quality of institutions subcomponent, and 3) the insider trading 
prosecution indicator; and Political Risk (Panel C): 1) the composite ICRG political risk rating and 2) the ICRG investment profile subcomponent.  In Panel D, we interact the growth 
opportunities measure with four indicators constructed by grouping all country-years into one of four boxes.  The interaction variables are as follows: an indicator that takes a value of 
one when the variable (private credit or law and order) is below the median and the equity market is closed, and zero otherwise; an indicator that takes the value of one when the 
variable is below the median and the equity market is open, and zero otherwise; an indicator that takes the value of one of the variable is above the median and the equity market is 
closed, and zero otherwise; and finally, and indicator that takes the value of one when the variable is above the median and the equity market is open, and zero otherwise.  We include 
chi-squared statistics for two sets of Wald tests: 1) the first evaluates closed versus open equity markets by jointly testing whether the first and second and the third and fourth 
coefficients are equivalent; 2) the second evaluates low versus high levels of either the private credit or law and order measures by jointly testing whether the first and third and second 
and fourth coefficients are equal.  *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  The weighting matrix we employ in our GMM estimation provides a correction 
for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.  All standard errors in parentheses account for the overlapping nature of the data. Table 7
Exploiting Growth Opportunities
Annual Average Excess Real GDP and Investment Growth (Five-year horizon)
1980-2002
Panel A: Local vs. Implied Global Growth Opportunities
All Countries Developed Emerging All Countries Developed Emerging
LEGO 0.0011 0.0099 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0255 -0.0011
(0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0060) (0.0046) (0.0046)
LEGO_MA 0.0006 0.0063 -0.0017 0.0050 0.0114 0.0066
(0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0034) (0.0053) (0.0090)
Panel B: Excess Exogenous (Implied) Global Growth Opportunities
All Countries Developed Emerging All Countries Developed Emerging
GEGO 0.0021 0.0039 -0.0004 0.0151 0.0246 -0.0066
(0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0080) (0.0105) (0.0139)
GEGO_MA 0.0064 0.0075 0.0007 0.0192 0.0225 0.0076
(0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0055) (0.0091) (0.0121) (0.0164)
The samples included reflect 50 (all), 17 (developed), and 30 (emerging) countries detailed in the data appendix.  The dependent variables are either 
the 5-year average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product or investment in excess of the total world counterpart.  We include in the 
regressions, but do not report, fixed effects.  In Panel A, we measure excess local growth opportunities as LEGO, the difference between local and 
exogenous growth opportunities (LGO-GGO).  For the full sample and the emerging markets, these regressions are unbalanced based on data 
availability.  In Panel B, we measure excess exogenous growth opportunities as GEGO, the difference between exogenous and total world growth 
opportunities (GGO-WGO).  We report the coefficient on the lagged growth opportunities measure.  The weighting matrix we employ in our GMM 
estimation provides a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.  All standard errors in parentheses account for the overlapping nature of the 
data.  
Excess GDP growth Excess Investment growth
Excess GDP growth Excess Investment growthTable 8
Exploiting Growth Opportunities and Market Integration
Annual Average Excess Real GDP and Investment Growth (Five-year horizon)
Sample I (50 countries): 1980-2002
Panel A: Capital Account Openness
GDP Investment GDP Investment
LEGO_MA 0.0019 0.0160 GEGO_MA 0.0032 0.0044
(0.0013) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0124)
LEGO_MA*Capital Account 
Openness (IMF) -0.0019 -0.0189
GEGO_MA*Capital Account 
Openness (IMF) 0.0080 0.0324
(0.0016) (0.0056) (0.0065) (0.0183)
LEGO_MA 0.0056 0.0502 GEGO_MA -0.0051 -0.0153
(0.0034) (0.0146) (0.0086) (0.0275)
LEGO_MA*Capital Account Degree 
of Openness (Quinn) -0.0051 -0.0530
GEGO_MA*Capital Account Degree 
of Openness (Quinn) 0.0181 0.0481
(0.0039) (0.0174) (0.0122) (0.0363)
Panel B: Equity Market Openness
LEGO_MA -0.0029 -0.0165 GEGO_MA -0.0059 -0.0001
(0.0081) (0.0248) (0.0058) (0.0177)
LEGO_MA*Official Equity Market 
Liberalization 0.0040 0.0227
GEGO_MA*Official Equity Market 
Liberalization 0.0196 0.0278
(0.0082) (0.0250) (0.0069) (0.0206)
LEGO_MA -0.0003 0.0194 GEGO_MA -0.0029 -0.0035
(0.0033) (0.0147) (0.0060) (0.0203)
LEGO_MA*Equity Market Degree of 
Openness 0.0015 -0.0158
GEGO_MA*Equity Market Degree of 
Openness 0.0160 0.0319
(0.0036) (0.0156) (0.0074) (0.0242)
Panel C: Banking Sector Openness
LEGO_MA 0.0023 0.0172 GEGO_MA 0.0005 0.0031





(0.0023) (0.0040) (0.0075) (0.0208)
LEGO_MA 0.0028 0.0342 GEGO_MA -0.0088 -0.0286
(0.0038) (0.0121) (0.0076) (0.0200)
LEGO_MA*Banking Sector 
Liberalization (First Sign) -0.0007 -0.0294
GEGO_MA*Banking Sector 
Liberalization (First Sign) 0.0221 0.0616
(0.0040) (0.0127) (0.0084) (0.0227)
This sample includes 50 developed and emerging countries detailed in the data appendix.  The dependent variables are either the 5-year 
average growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product or investment in excess of the total world counterpart.  We include in the 
regressions, but do not report, fixed effects.  We measure excess exogenous growth opportunities as GEGO_MA, the difference between 
exogenous and total world growth opportunities (GGO_MA-WGO_MA).  We report the coefficient on the growth opportunities measure and 
interaction terms with 1) a 0/1 indicator of capital account openness from the IMF, 2) a continuous measure of the degree of capital account 
openness from Quinn (only 48 countries are available), 3) official equity market liberalization from Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2004), 
4) the degree of equity market openness (investability), and 5) two indicators of banking sector liberalalization -- opening the banking sector 
to foreign banks (give data limitations, this regression covers only 41 countries).  
The weighting matrix we employ in our GMM estimation provides a correction for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.  All standard errors in 
parentheses account for the overlapping nature of the data.  The graph shows the cross-sectional average of the December value of the absolute 
value of LEGO for each year between 1980 and 2002. 
For each sample, the graph shows the cross-sectional average of the absolute value of 
GEGO for each year between 1980 and 2002.
Figure 2: Sample Average of Absolute Value of GEGO: 
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1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002For each country, the average absolute value of the differences between the country-
specific industry weights (based on relative market capitalization) and the world 
industry weights is calculated across all 35 industries each year. For the sample of 
developed countries, the graph shows the average value across countries.
Figure 3: Average Absolute Difference btw. Local and Global 
Industry Weights: Developed Countries (S), 
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Annual IW start in
IFC:
Annual IW start in
UNIDO:
Annual IW start in
- World - Jan-73 -- -
I, III Argentina ARG Jul-91 1984 1983
I, II Australia AUS Jan-73 1973 1973
I, II Austria AUT Jan-73 1973 1973
I, III Bangladesh BGD Jan-96 1996 1973
I, II Belgium BEL Jan-73 1973 1973
I, III Brazil BRA May-99 1983 1990
I, II Canada CAN Jan-73 1973 1973
I, III Chile CHL Jul-89 1975 1973
I, III Colombia COL Feb-93 1984 1973
I, III Cote d'Ivoire CIV Jan-96 1996 1973
I, II Denmark DNK Jan-73 1973 1973
I, III Egypt EGY Jan-96 1996 1973
I Finland FIN Mar-88 1988 1973
I, II France FRA Jan-73 1973 1973
I, II Germany DEU Jan-73 1973 1973
I, III Greece GRC Jan-90 1975 1973
I, III India IND Jan-90 1975 1973
I, III Indonesia IDN Jan-91 1989 1973
I, II Ireland IRL Jan-73 1973 1973
I, III Israel ISR Jan-93 1997 1973
I Italy ITA Apr-84 1973 1973
I, III Jamaica JAM Jan-96 1996 1973
I, II Japan JPN Jan-73 1973 1973
I, III Jordan JOR Jul-86 1979 1973
I, III Kenya KEN Jan-96 1996 1973
I, III Korea, South KOR Jan-88 1975 1973
I, III Malaysia MYS Jan-86 1984 1973
I, III Mexico MEX Jul-90 1975 1973
I, III Morocco MAR Jan-96 1996 1973
I, II Netherlands NLD Jan-73 1973 1973
I New Zealand NZL Jan-88 1988 1973
I, III Nigeria NGA Sep-86 1984 1973
I, II Norway NOR Jan-73 1980 1973
I, III Pakistan PAK Apr-86 1984 1973
I, III Philippines PHL Sep-87 1984 1973
I, III Portugal PRT Jan-90 1986 1973
I, II Singapore SGP Jan-73 1973 1973
I, II, III South Africa ZAF Jan-73 1992 1973
I Spain ESP Jan-80 1987 1973
I, III Sri Lanka LKA Jan-93 1992 1973
I, II Sweden SWE Jan-73 1982 1973
I, II Switzerland CHE Jan-73 1973 1986
I, III Thailand THA Jan-87 1976 1973
I, III Trinidad and Tobago TTO Jan-96 1996 1973
I, III Tunisia TUN Jan-96 1996 1973
I, III Turkey TUR Apr-90 1986 1973
I, II United Kingdom GBR Jan-73 1973 1973
I, II United States USA Jan-73 1973 1973
I, III Venezuela VEN Mar-92 1984 1973
I, III Zimbabwe ZWE Jan-86 1975 1973
For the construction of LGO, market PE ratios from Datastream (preferred source), IFC, and MSCI are used. The table shows which source is used and the 
first month for which data are available. For the construction of GGO, industry weights (IW) are obtained from IFC (preferred source) and Datastream. The 
table reports which source is used and since which year market values are available. For the construction of GGO (VA), industry weights (IW) are obtained 
from UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database. The table reports since which year market values are available. 
LGO: Sources and Availability of PE GGO: Sources and Availability of Industry Weights (IW)Appendix Table A2
Dating Liberalization
Official Equity Market  Banking Liberalization  Banking Liberalization 
Country Liberalization Year Year "First Sign" Year
Argentina (ARG) 1989 1980 - 1983, 1994 1980 - 1983, 1994
Bangladesh (BGD) 1991 n/a n/a
Brazil (BRA) 1991 1995 1995
Chile (CHL) 1992 1998 1998
Colombia (COL) 1991 1990 1990
Cote d'Voire (CIV) 1995 n/a n/a
Egypt (EGY) 1992 1993 1993
Greece (GRC) 1987 1992 1987
India (IND) 1992 closed 1992
Indonesia (IDN) 1989 1999 1988
Israel (ISR) 1993 open open
Jamaica (JAM) 1991 n/a n/a
Japan (JPN) 1983 1985 1985
Jordan (JOR) 1995 n/a n/a
Kenya (KEN) 1995 open open
Korea (KOR) 1992 1998 1982
Malaysia (MYS) 1988 closed closed
Mexico (MEX) 1989 1994 1991
Morocco (MAR) 1988 n/a n/a
New Zealand (NZL) 1987 1987 1987
Nigeria (NGA) 1995 n/a n/a
Pakistan (PAK) 1991 closed 1994
Philippines (PHL) 1991 2000 1994
Portugal (PRT) 1986 1984 1984
South Africa (ZAF) 1996 open open
Spain (ESP) 1985 open open
Sri Lanka (LKA) 1991 1998 1988
Thailand (THA) 1987 closed 1997
Trinidad & Tobago (TTO) 1997 n/a n/a
Tunisia (TUN) 1995 n/a n/a
Turkey (TUR) 1989 open open
Venezuela (VEN) 1990 1994 1994
Zimbabwe (ZWE) 1993 n/a n/a
The official equity market liberalization dates are based on Bekaert and Harvey (2002).  Banking Liberalization dates and "First Sign" dates are 
defined in Table 2. Note that foreign banks could not enter the Argentinean banking market between 1984 and 1993. n/a indicates information for 
the country is not available.  All other countries are considered fully liberalized from 1980-2002.